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 The history of the political thought on pleasure is not a cloistered affair in which scholars 
only engage one another.  In political thought, one commonly finds a critical engagement with 
the wider public and the ruling classes, which are both perceived to be dangerously hedonistic.  
The effort of many political thinkers is directed towards showing that other political ends are 
more worthy than pleasure: Plato battles vigorously against Calicles’ pleasure seeking in the 
Gorgias, Augustine argues in The City of God against the human tendency to hedonism in favor 
of a profound distrust of pleasure, and even Machiavelli claims in The Prince that it is in the 
prince’s best interest to separate his pursuit of pleasure from his pursuit of political power.   
The thrust of the majority of political thought is to interrupt the popular equation that 
links pleasure with the good.  Instead, political thought has largely followed Plato’s lead and has 
worked to contain hedonism on two fronts.  First, pleasure is rigorously separated from ethical 
and political good: what is good is not identical with what is pleasurable even if the two 
sometimes overlap.   Second, even where the pursuit of pleasure is judged to be coincident with 
the good, pleasure should only be pursued to the degree it is rational to do so and pursued in the 
most rational way.  Of course, it is not true that all thinkers hold to these two positions on 
pleasure.  Epicureanism and utilitarianism are two major schools of thought that challenge the 
first precept equating pleasure with the good.  Both Epicureanism and utilitarianism argue that 
the only good is pleasure.  However, it is much less frequently that one finds a thinker 
challenging the second Platonic position that reason must master and guide our pursuit of 
pleasure—even the Epicureans and utilitarians believe that pleasure is best pursued rationally.  
However, Foucault has attracted recent attention by challenging the idea that reason should 
dominate the pursuit of pleasure. 
 This entry on pleasure has three parts.  The first part works through Plato and Aristotle as 
thinkers who set the dominant tradition in political thought of distinguishing the good from the 
pleasant and arguing that pleasure seeking needs to be submitted to rational control.  The second 
part will tackle Epicurus and Bentham as representatives of Epicureanism and utilitarianism 
respectively, in order to show how they challenge the separation of the pleasant and the good 
with their enlightened hedonism.  The final part will look at Foucault and how his work 
challenges the Platonic political orthodoxy on both fronts. 
 The impact of Plato on the political thought governing pleasure would be hard to 
overestimate.  Aristotle, Epictetus, Augustine, and much of the Christian tradition take important 
cues from his work—even utilitarianism is in many respects a reaction against his work and a 
challenge to the ancients’ hold on political philosophy. Subtly and in a complex fashion, pleasure 
is a theme throughout Plato’s work but it is perhaps most politically telling in the Gorgias.  
 The Gorgias finds Socrates tackling the arguments of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.  As 
the drama unfolds, Callicles takes over the argument from Gorgias and Polus and proclaims 
himself brave enough to say what the others have not: the rich and powerful live best because 
they experience the most pleasure (2007: 482d, 483d).  When Callicles makes the argument that 
the good and the pleasant are identical we should note that Callicles is not merely saying that 
pleasure is preferable to pain but that pleasure is the only good.  To achieve this 
good/pleasurable life, Callicles claims that one must want and pursue as much pleasure as 
possible: “[I]t is necessary for the one who’s to live rightly to allow his desires to be as big as 
possible and not to curtail them” (2007: 491e-492a).  This dramatic context provides Plato with 
the setting to make the argument that the good and pleasure are not identical even if pleasure 
sometimes accompanies what is good. 
 In a memorable and humorously vulgar reductio, Socrates gets Callicles to agree that 
scratching an itch is a pleasure.  Socrates then claims that, according to Callicles, the greatest 
pleasure would be to have a tremendous and unsatisfiable itch so that one would receive the 
maximal pleasure of the longest duration from continually itching it (2007: 494d).  Callicles 
reluctantly agrees but is shocked at Socrates next suggestion: Socrates claims that, according to 
Callicles’ argument, we would have to say that the catamite who had tremendously and 
unendingly itchy hemorrhoids could be said to be living the best life, if only this individual 
constantly worked at itching them in a way very analogous to a sex act (Tougas 1998: 136).  
Obviously, humor and shock are hoped for reactions but they serve on a gut level to reinforce the 
philosophical point that a life of maximal and continual pleasure is not necessarily a good life.  
While what is pleasurable might sometimes be good, not all pleasures are good and not all goods 
are pleasurable. 
Precisely what is so disturbing to Callicles about the example Socrates gives of the 
catamite is that the individual becomes enslaved to their pleasures and they take up the role of an 
passive and dominated ephebe in relation to pleasure.  Instead of being enslaved to pleasure, 
Socrates tells Callicles that one needs to learn self-mastery through moderation in order to live 
rationally (2007: 505b).  Thus, the argument is brought to its two primary conclusions on 
pleasure: first, that pleasure and the good are not identical and, second, that individuals should 
master their impulses for pleasure and pain through moderation in order to be free to rationally 
pursue the good. 
Although Aristotle criticizes his teacher’s understanding of pleasure, he remains faithful 
to the imperatives established by the Gorgias to separate pleasure from the good and to live a life 
of rational self-mastery in pursuit of the good.  In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle criticizes 
Plato indirectly via a scathing analysis of Plato’s nephew and inheritor of the Academy, 
Speusippus.  Aristotle finds that both Plato and Speusippus develop an understanding of pleasure 
that is built from a misleading generalization about physical pleasure.   In physical pleasure, 
pleasure seems to result from the satisfaction of a lack: hunger succeeds to the satisfaction of 
eating, thirst succumbs to drinking, and, as we saw, a terrible itch is relieved by scratching.  
Aristotle argues that it is mistaken to infer from these physical observations that pleasure is the 
satisfaction of a lack. 
Instead, we should see that pleasure results from the proper operation of the individual’s 
capacities.  For instance, eating is pleasurable not because it rids one of a lack (hunger) but 
because the faculty of digestion is working properly when the food is consumed.  The pleasure of 
eating does not come from the satisfaction of a lack but from the part of the body that is working 
excellently to rid one of the lack.  In short, for Aristotle pleasure is the result of an activity that 
properly puts a capacity to work and is not the replenishment of a lack, “pleasures are ways of 
being at work and are ends, and they do not result from states that are coming into being but 
from capacities being exercised” (2002: 1153a10-12). This gives Aristotle a different 
understanding of what pleasure is than Plato even if their positions will overlap on key normative 
points: like Plato, Aristotle finds that pleasure is different than the good but he argues that 
pleasure is much more tightly related to the good in that pleasure is supervenient upon the 
excellent exercise of the individual’s capacities.   
Although pleasure is supervenient upon excellent exercise of a capacity, Aristotle is no 
hedonist: he would not agree that one can follow one’s pleasures to the good.  Although pleasure 
results from the proper exercise of one’s capacities, pleasure is no indicator of which capacities 
to exercise, when, and in what measure.  For instance, one could exercise the capacity to eat to 
such a degree that one could grow ill and die from the effects of overeating.  It is clear that even 
those who are extremely obese still feel pleasure in eating because the digestive capacity is 
properly working.  In this case, irrationally following the pleasure of eating would result in the 
destruction of one’s being; it would be better to exercise temperance, forgo the pleasure of 
digestion, and learn to cultivate other capacities (and pleasures) instead.  Aristotle thought the 
lure of the bodily pleasures that we share with the animals were such a draw away from the 
cultivation of rational capacities that he wrote “the whole concern of both of virtue and of 
politics is about pleasures and pains” (2002: 1105a11-12).  Politics is about the pursuit of a 
community for the good and so rational use has to be made of pleasures so that the right 
pleasures are experienced at the right time.  Although Aristotle developed a very different notion 
of pleasure than Plato, he remained committed to the Platonic position that pleasure and the good 
are not identical and that pleasure must be mastered by reason in order for pleasure to have a 
proper place in ethical and political life.  
Historically, many thinkers have challenged the dominant view established by Plato and 
Aristotle that the good and the pleasant are not identical.  Most notably, the Epicureans of 
antiquity and modern utilitarians have both argued for an enlightened hedonism.  Here I will 
examine Epicurus and Bentham as representatives and founders of their schools.  Epicurus 
argued that the good was identical with the pleasant but his approach hardly resulted in an out-
of-control hedonism.  Like the Stoics found in their pursuit of happiness, the Epicureans found 
that the surest road to pleasure was to be found in the proper regulation of the soul and not in the 
pursuit of external goods: where the pleasures of the external world were unreliable and needed 
the cooperation of other people and events, the soul and its pleasures were in the individual’s 
control and hence reliable.  More specifically, if an individual could turn away from the external 
world and turn to the life of the soul, which he had control over, he would be free to live in the 
happiness of the soul by calling up past pleasurable memories and reliving them in the present or 
by thinking forward to anticipated future pleasures. By turning to the soul and its pleasant 
memories and anticipations, an individual could live in happiness regardless of what was 
occurring externally.  Epicurus even boasts that with just bread and water he could be as 
felicitous as Jupiter himself. 
Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, shares Epicurus’ understanding of the good as 
coinciding with pleasure: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to 
determine what we shall do” (1879: 1).  However, Bentham does not agree with Epicurus on the 
best method for pursuing pleasure.  This difference can be traced to the maxim that Bentham 
gives to govern his hedonism, “It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number which is the 
measure of right and wrong” (1776: ii).  Bentham’s pursuit of pleasure turned outward where 
Epicurus’ turned inward: Bentham attempted to govern decisions based on which actions would 
result in the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number instead of the greatest pleasure 
for the lone individual.  
Bentham and Epicurus both move away from the Platonic tradition that is dominant in 
political thought by refusing Plato’s argument that the good is not identical to the pleasant.   Both 
Bentham and Epicurus want to argue that pleasure is identical with the good and that the best life 
results in the maximal attainment of pleasure.  However, neither Epicurus nor Bentham 
challenge the supremacy of reason in guiding the pursuit of pleasure.  Both hold that individuals 
need to master themselves and not be ruled by the immediate pushes and pulls of pleasure.  They 
argue that individuals and communities need to be able to practice temperance and pursue 
pleasure rationally in order to maximize pleasure.  Although Epicurus and Bentham challenged 
the Platonic separation of the good from pleasure, they did not challenge the ideal of rational 
self-mastery. 
Foucault challenges both Platonic points in that he strategically aligns the good with the 
pleasant and positions the pursuit of pleasure as a process that transforms reason. Foucault is 
different in another important way than the other four thinkers that we have discussed: Foucault 
understands reason and subjectivity to be historically malleable.  Through time, he holds, new 
subjects emerge, new human natures, and reason is radically transformed in the process.  For 
instance, in The Order of Things Foucault tracks changes in reason across the three fields of 
economics, linguistics, and biology over the last four centuries.  He finds that radically different 
forms of thought were ‘rational’ across that period of time.   For our purposes, we just need to 
consider a smaller portion of Foucault’s analysis of the transformation of reason—that which 
pertains to pleasure and self-mastery. 
In some of his last work before he died, notably in The Use of Pleasure, Foucault 
investigates Greco-Roman morality and pleasure.  Foucault tracks the history of the ideas of self-
mastery, reason, and pleasure from antiquity, to Imperial Rome, early Christianity, and on to the 
present.  He finds that the philosophy of self-mastery reaches an important turning point in the 
Stoics and in early Christian thinkers.  In late Imperial Rome, the individual comes to be thought 
of as incapable of properly mastering its own use of pleasure through moderation and reason.  
Especially in Christian thought, for instance in Augustine, the individual becomes no longer able 
to master itself and so becomes a ‘sinner’ and unable to establish self-control in regards to 
pleasure.  What is the individual to do when it is necessary to master oneself through reason but 
finds that one is neither rational nor moderate enough to do so?  Plato provides Augustine the 
template to answer this dilemma in the Republic: the more rational should rule the less rational 
and provide them the control over the use of pleasure that they lack.  For Augustine, the more 
rational agent that should rule over us is clearly God.    
Today, we practice a kind of scientific Augustinianism in that we find the rational agency 
we lack in the experts and knowledge produced by the social sciences.  We have experts who 
determine for individuals and communities the proper way to do almost everything including 
how to love, remain healthy, pursue school productively, rehabilitate deviants, land a job, pursue 
a career, eat well—there are even experts who can come to the store and show one how to shop 
properly.   Modern individuals typically experience themselves as lacking the proper tools to 
rationally master themselves and so they turn to the rational expert—often in the guise of the 
social scientist—who can provide a framework for living to them with the result that today 
people are willingly dominated by those with specialized scientific knowledges (Foucault 1990: 
53-54). 
Foucault finds that the practice of rational self-domination trumpeted by Plato has 
changed through time to become the handmaid of domination in that individuals have become 
incapable of mastering their pleasures and require a more rational agent to determine the 
appropriate measures for them.  Foucault argues that there needs to be a “counterattack” to 
transform the contemporary understanding of self and reason so that individuals no longer lie 
under the burden of a project of self-mastery that they cannot achieve except through submission 
and domination by others (Foucault 1990: 157).  In The History of Sexuality: Volume I, Foucault 
argues that we need to turn to “bodies and pleasures” to resist contemporary domination (1990: 
157).  Why?  Through following our pleasures, we might turn inward to ourselves as guides and 
quit looking to others to provide us with the reason that we presume we lack.  Through focusing 
on the lead of our pleasures, we can turn to ourselves as a source of leadership instead of placing 
ourselves at the mercy of experts.   Through working to follow our pleasures by developing 
them, intensifying them, and even transforming them, we can create new bodies susceptible to 
these pleasures and possessed of a new form of reason adequate to these tasks. 
While it is clear that Foucault’s hedonistic politics is only intended as a possible remedy 
for a contemporary problem, it is also equally clear that his politics strategically equates pleasure 
with the good and seeks to subordinate reason to practices of pleasure such that reason would be 
transformed through the pursuit of pleasures (McWhorter 1999: 157, 182).   Even if this move is 
only a temporary and strategic response to problem, it is notable for being one of the few 
political philosophies to challenge the lead of the Platonic politics of pleasure on both counts: 
Foucault challenges both the differentiation of the good and pleasure and the imperative that 
pleasure must be pursued rationally. Instead, a new reason and a new subject should be pursued 
through the pleasures of the body. 
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